Monday, July 8, 2013

How To Destroy Any Theist Making The Moral Argument For God


I just debated a very incompetent opponent on debate.org over whether the moral argument for god is sound. I hit him with the very well known Euthyphro Dilemma to see if he could handle it—and apparently he couldn't because he almost completely ignored it.

Now when making the Euthyphro, you absolutely must preempt the most common response that theists are going to use—that god is good. If you cover that before they make it, as I have below, then you leave your opponent no room to get out of it, and they're logically backed into a corner.

So the following passage from my debate below is how to do that properly, in case any theist pulls the moral debate on you:

One counter argument to the moral argument is called the Euthyphro Dilemma. It was posed by Socrates 2,400 years ago. It asks, “Is something moral because God commands it, or does God command it because it is moral?” 
The person who believes objective morality is founded in God here has two options. If something is moral because God commands it, then morality is arbitrarily decided by God. God could command that we murder our children or own slaves and it would be good – merely because God said so. The actual commands would be meaningless and we’d have no way to gauge whether something is morally good or not except on whether it was commanded by God. This would be a “might makes right” ideology.

In the other option, God is merely a messenger who alerts us to what is right or wrong independently to whether God exists or not. Morality is not decided by God, God is simply the enforcer of what is naturally right or wrong.

Neither option is particularly appealing to the theist. The first option makes morality simply dependent on God’s opinion at any given time. He could command that murder and rape are good, then change his mind and command that they are wrong. The second option turns God merely into a messenger, who one might say is redundant, and at best can only serve as a medium by which natural truths are known. The ontological foundation of [good] would exist independently of him.

Now the Euthyphro Dilemma has been around for over 2000 years and theists have had plenty of time to respond to it. One common objection is to say that God is good – he is the absolute standard by which good is measured and founded. But is this a successful refutation of the dilemma? 
If God is the standard of goodness, by what means can we know this to be true? So we can ask, why is God good? The theist might say God is good because he is intrinsically loving, compassionate and fair. But then all we have to do is reformulate the Euthyphro Dilemma accordingly: Is God good because he is loving, compassionate and fair, or is being loving, compassionate and fair good because God is good? If you pick the former, then the attributes God has that make him good exist independently of God and are merely descriptive terms applied to God, if you pick the latter then how can we possibly know that being loving, compassionate and fair is good? It can’t simply be good because God is good, because then the word “good” is meaningless.  
There has to be a reason why we call something good. So what characteristic comes first – God’s goodness, or his being loving, compassionate and fair? The theist is in a squirm here. He cannot simply define God as being “good” without justification. Goodness has to be justified descriptively. But if those descriptions are warranted, then they imply goodness for epistemological reasons that are verifiable due to their intentions and effects. And thus the source of goodness would exist independently of God. 

So which way is the theist going to choose? They're damned if they do and damned if they don't—which is exactly where I prefer them.

If you want additional counter arguments against the notion that god is good, you can either read the rest of my debate on debate.org, or you can check out section 1.2 of my lengthy post "Objective Morality Without God."

32 comments:

  1. I agree with you , and I've offered the same before in my debates with theists. What happens invariably is that the theist goes all "eleventy" and declares that because God's nature is good they avoid the dilemma somehow. I agree this response is incoherent, and doesn't escape the dilemma, but they will say that it does, and usually call forward some idiot authority (Craig, or some other) upon which to hoist their fallacious petard.

    Which is why philosophy sucks.

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  2. Well I wouldn't go so far to say that philosophy sucks. It is absolutely essential to even have any discussion on ethics or to even make sense of science. In fact I just wrote a post about that here: http://www.atheismandthecity.com/2013/07/science-vs-philosophy.html

    But I agree with you that it is disingenuous when a theist just asserts that god is good without any justification of it, because if they try to justify it, they will inevitably run into the problem I highlighted above.

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  3. My frustation with philosophy (not really with philosophy, with people) is that its traditions (that of the very arcane history of failed thoughts) can be used too often to provide cover to those who are avoiding the truth. Too many times I've seen interlocutors cover themselves in the inky cloud of philosophical references to claim that the Euthyphro or whatnot has actually been resolved, etc. As long as we play along by pretending that Thomism, etc. represent the unassailable height of human thought, we play along with this pathetic gambit.

    I think I agree with you entirely, btw. It's just that I am not so sanguine that your debate opponent has accepted the dilemma that is the Euthyphro in the same way you may have.

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    1. OK, I can see where you're coming from. It's true that some theists use philosophy as a way of throwing up a cloud of smoke to disguise their bad arguments and to try to dress them up to appear sophisticated. Personally, I say fight fire with fire. The best way that you can dissect such a front is by knowing as much philosophy as you can. That way you'll be less likely to let that sophistry pass your radar.

      It's best to know where all the historical philosophers failed so that you can counter any modern reprise of their failed logic. I am just weary when I hear many atheists now saying "Philosophy is dead." It's a bad move and many don't realize that technically, that itself is a philosophical statement. So we should never abandoned philosophy, just make sure it's updated to fit the best available science.

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  4. I admit to loving the philosophical discussion brought about by posts and comments on blogs like these and at apologist sites -- I also think that the format (post, comments, back and forth) is satisfyingly "Socratic" in its approach, and I've learned a lot more philosophy from engaging with them than I ever did in college or on my own.

    I know that I commented once on Luke Muehlauser's old blog (Luke loved him his philosophy) that when I finally got around to taking an Intro to Philosphy course my Junior year in college I found it to be a huuge waste of time. At that point I had a decent enough background in science, history, etc., that going through all that was excruciating. I was surprised that Luke agreed with me, and I think I've come across something he wrote later that full on endorses adopting a very different approach to teaching philosophy than the traditional curriculum that I came across in the late 1980s.

    So, yeah, truth is I love philosophy. But part of me is still pained that I have to read crap about Thomism or Liebniz or whatnot every few months because, as a group, we defenders of reason have been too generous in allowing that some pre-scientific thinker was really, truly, onto something that we've all since forgotten.

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    1. I'm sorry your experience in philosophy class was bad. For me, it lead me to the atheist I am now, so it's been a positive experience. For one thing, my professor taught us to think critically about religion. I was already an atheist, but I left class armed with more sophisticated arguments against theism.

      And I studied ethics more and through my philosophy education it has certainly made me a better ethical person. Science can't do that - only philosophy can.

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  5. "If God is the standard of goodness, by what means can we KNOW this to be true?"

    Fallacy, The Euthyphro Dilemma Requires the assumption that He exists, you need to assume God exist before you ask,

    "“Is something moral because God commands it, or does God command it because it is moral?”

    Which is refuted by the fact that YHWH is Good, so when you ask,

    "So we can ask, WHY is God good?""

    Because He is... Good, The only Good is, God(YHWH: The Father and The Son and The Holy Spirit)

    So no Euthyphro Dilemma, if we cannot use that fact that YHWH is Good then you cannot use the Euthyphro Dilemma as an argument, as with this argument you have to assume He exist and then ask,

    "“Is something moral because God commands it, or does God command it because it is moral?”

    in which can be refuted by that YHWH is Good and that His commands are based on Nature, Moral isn't a distinct property but He is The Moral.

    you ask,

    "Is God good because he is loving, compassionate and fair, or is being loving, compassionate and fair good because God is good?"

    This is easy to refute, YHWH is Good because that's His Nature, and He is Loving not because He's good but because that's His Nature, YHWH is Love(1 John 4:8), and He is Compassionate and Fair because that's who He is not based on another property.

    "So what characteristic comes first – God’s goodness, or his being loving, compassionate and fair?"

    This assume that YHWH "has" these characteristics, in Theism He doesn't "have" Good, He IS Good, He IS Love, He IS Life, He Is not "He has"

    The argument falls apart because it assumes Good is a Distinct property from YHWH, that it's something he does,but it isn't, He IS Good, Good isn't a Mindless Property, it's Personal, it's YHWH, everything good we do is from Him, remember what Jesus Christ said about bearing fruit and sticking to the vines?

    John 15:4 - "Remain in me, as I also remain in you. No branch can bear fruit by itself; it must remain in the vine. Neither can you bear fruit unless you remain in me." - Jesus Christ

    Evil is a Lack of Good, a Philsophical Fact.

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    1. Wow your arguments are so bad.

      "Fallacy, The Euthyphro Dilemma Requires the assumption that He exists, you need to assume God exist before you ask,"

      Remember in my statement above this I asked "IF god is the standard of goodness" so my question is purely conditional, no assumption is made.

      "Because He is... Good, The only Good is, God(YHWH: The Father and The Son and The Holy Spirit)"

      There you go, you just asserted that god is good. How can you demonstrate god is good?

      "in which can be refuted by that YHWH is Good and that His commands are based on Nature, Moral isn't a distinct property but He is The Moral."

      Isn't it just the case that you're just conflating the word good with god? Why is god good?

      you say:

      "YHWH is Good because that's His Nature, and He is Loving not because He's good but because that's His Nature, YHWH is Love(1 John 4:8), and He is Compassionate and Fair because that's who He is not based on another property."

      Defining god as the source of “good” is mere theological wordplay. It doesn't demonstrate that “good” cannot exist independently of god. Even if goodness is an essential property of god, it is a property that can apply to other things independently of god’s existence. Just think of how being hot is an essential property of fire – fire must be hot, it cannot be cold. But “hot” can apply to many other things independently of fire. For example, microwaves cause things to be hot and so does friction.

      "This assume that YHWH "has" these characteristics, in Theism He doesn't "have" Good, He IS Good, He IS Love, He IS Life, He Is not "He has""

      Again, if you're going to say that god "is" these characteristics you suffer from the same problem I outlined above, that is you're just conflating god with goodness and you have not demonstrated it to be true. It's just wordplay. How can a being that commands genocide, slavery and dashing babies heads again rocks be good?

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  6. As I was thinking about the "You can be good without God" slogan this morning, it occcured to me that at least on two points this slogan is Scriptural, and I want to commend the people who came up with it. First, in Matthew 7:11 Jesus says, "If you, then, though you are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children,...". Jesus, the Son of God, states that a person who is evil knows how to give good gifts and knows how to do good things. Second, you make the statement that a person can be good without God, not that a person is good without God. This implies you are not there yet and have some work to do to become good. Romans 3:23 says, "for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God,". So, in your slogan you say that a person can do good things without God, and that you fall short of being good...both of these points are Scriptural.

    As far as your hating religion? Jesus hates religion as well. There are those who want to give you a list of things to do and a list of things not to do, and by following these things God will accept you. That is not Scriptural. What Jesus wants is to give you life and a relationship with Him that is free to you. He paid the price. He went to the cross to take away your sin and He wants to credit you with His righteousness, something you cannot earn. That's what the Apostle Paul means when he tells us that salvation is by grace and not by works.

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    1. Well it seems to me that you're just playing a game with semantics. You say that without god one can do good - I agree with you so far, but then you say one cannot be good without god - I disagree with you there. Although I think you said that I said that. Can you show me where? I think one can do good and be good with or without god. It doesn't necessarily matter what they believe.

      Well if Jesus was not a fan of religion, then I can get on board with him. I think when you put him on a pedestal and make a religion our of him, it all goes down hill after that.

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  7. I think you've misunderstood the third option, namely "God is the good", although I find that to be a rather simplistic rendering of it. You ask "why is God good?" God is by definition the maximally greatest being that exists, and that entails moral perfection. Your point at the end "there has to be a reason we call something good" is about moral semantics, or the meaning of words, rather than moral ontology, or the basis in reality of morality. While I do disagree with your argument, I appreciate that you have not simply ignored this third option. Most atheists do.

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    1. The problem is simply defining god as good, it doesn't demonstrate anything other than one can equate terms verbally. You will still have to justify god's goodness with things that would be good independently of his existence. I go into that a bit further here: http://www.atheismandthecity.com/2013/02/a-case-for-secular-morality-objective.html

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  8. I think there is an option that is not being payed attention to at all: an action is good if God would perform the action in a said circumstance. If we defend (I certainly do) perfect being theology, then God is maximally great. However, if God is an objectively maximally great being, then any action he performs is maximally great by definition. A couple things follow from this.

    Firstly, that if we define morality as what actions are objectively better to take then others, then we have solid grounds for morality in God and for refuting the Euthyphro dilemma. If God is objectively maximally great, then we don't even need to say that the foundation of morality is a part of maximal greatness, but simply IS maximal greatness. In other words, when we talk about morality we talk about striving to be like God, which is by definition maximally great. So, anything contributing to knowledge (omniscience) positive abilities (omnipotence) longer lasting and stronger things (eternality and immortality) would be something that is morally good. Anything taking away from these things is morally bad. Since God is objectively great in this sense, and is maximally great, then he provides an objective standard for morality. However, if such a thing does not exist then there is no actual foundation for objective moral values. Essentially, morality turns into a tautology given that a maximally great being exists.

    Secondly, from this, morality can be given foundation by appealing to things other than love. Love would simply be bi-conditional to morality since it contributes to it, but it is only a part of morality in the sense that it is required to uphold the qualitative foundations of it to the maximum level. Any creator who doesn't care for his creation is not going to contribute to any sort of longer lasting quality, like giving a soul for everlasting life, or desiring creatures to come to himself of their own volition, thus creating free creatures that end up morally perfect. So, for any great-making properties to actually be maximally great, it would require love.

    Thirdly, I need to clarify on that last part. What I made it sound like was that God desires all to become maximally great, but that's not what I meant. That would be the equivalent to saying that God wants more of himself (which true only in a convoluted sense). By creatures coming to him to be morally perfect, I simply mean in terms of the actions they would choose to perform. In other words, they would only choose morally perfect actions to perform. Once again, being morally perfect doesn't mean being maximally great, but simply means that you would perform things that a maximally great being would do in a circumstance.

    In conclusion, since God is a necessarily existing being if he does exist, and his nature would necessarily be maximally great, and since maximal greatness would be the standard for morality, I conclude that if God exist then he is by necessity and by definition the standard for morality.

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  9. Unlike you, I don't accept perfect being theology. I think it has obvious flaws. To say that an action is good if god would perform that action in said circumstance is really to say god can do anything he wants and it "becomes" perfect because god is perfect. So if god said killing homosexuals is good, would you agree that doing so is objectively morally right, and perhaps obligatory? What if god said slavery is acceptable and slaves should obey their masters, even ones that are cruel? Would that also be morally perfect, and obligatory?

    The idea that whatever god does is perfect by definition makes it difficult for me to determine how any such being could be good. They could do anything they want, e.g. slaughter innocent children, torture people and animals with diseases, and I'd be expected to believe god is good. Sorry. I simply will not adopt that kind of slave mentality. What I want to know is how you determine what a perfect being is, what standard or metric do you use when deciding what attributes a perfect being would have? Are you using a standard independent of god, or are you using god as the standard to determine god? If the latter is true, you're making a circular reasoning that I think is the whole problem with determining god is perfect in the first place. And I simply don't see how you could determine that such a perfect being would also be the god of Abraham. That to me is a total non-sequitor.

    You said, "if we define morality as what actions are objectively better to take then others, then we have solid grounds for morality in God and for refuting the Euthyphro dilemma." I disagree. First, I don't accept that maximal greatness can be grounded ontologically in a being. Second, if it somehow could (and I'm using my imagination here) then it would also exist independently of god. Thirdly, I know of no religion that doesn't contain a deity that justifies slavery, the mistreatment of certain people, or other bizarre moral values that make no practical sense whatsoever. So even if such a perfect being could exist, it has never revealed itself to us, and certainly hasn't in the Abrahamic religions.

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    1. You need to read my post again. You didn't grasp what I was saying, and I don't think you what the debate here is about.

      First of all, you don't even understand how debating about this works. We're asking the question "if God exists, then could he be the foundation of morality?" For you to even ask this question you have to grant the hypothetical that God exists. Otherwise, I can easily dismiss the question as internally inconsistent. In other words, if we grant that maximally great being exists then it logically follows that he would be objectively maximally great, and that he would also be the standard for maximal greatness. If you do anything else then you forfeit your right to even present the Euthyphro Dilemma. The Euthyphro dilemma is arguing that God is deficient with regards to explaining morality. without granting a definition of God then we can't even ask whether the definition is inconsistent with it being the foundation of morality.

      Second of all, you never gave your reasons for why you don't think maximal greatness cannot be grounded ontologically in a being. You seem to assume that either God caused maximal greatness to come into existence or that maximal greatness caused God to come into existence, or to change. You're completely leaving out the possibility that maximal greatness and God are biconditional. Keep in mind, what I did there was not the same as saying "God literally is good" as is the standard response to the Euthyphro dilemma. What I did is say that since we consider morality to be actions that are objectively better or worse than others, then maximal greatness as a foundation is a flawless foundation for this objectivity. Since if God exists, he literally would be maximal greatness, then it follows that since maximal greatness must be what morality is ultimately based on because it would determine what is better than something else. Without a foundation of some sort of greatness in this way, then objective morality could not exist. Also, I'm not saying that an action "becomes great" if God does it, but that it would have to be great since it comes from a maximally great being, and a maximally great being wold only do great things.

      Thirdly, I want to address the all too common notion that by presenting any argument from God, that I'm trying to prove, based on that argument alone, the Christian God. that' now what I'm doing and I didn't even mention the christian God in my post. The reason why we resort to providing evidence for any generic God is first is because the Christian claim is this: that God rose Jesus from the dead and by doing so vindicated his claims. I don't know about you, but it seems hard to convince somebody that God performed any action at all if the person that you're trying to persuade doesn't even believe in God in the first place. For this reason, providing existence of a God at all always comes before providing evidence of a specific God.

      Fourthly, regardless of anything it is said that god commanded in the Bible has nothing to do with the starting point of whether any sort of God exists at all. What we're questioning is the possibility of a God being the foundation of moral values. I don't think your objections hold any weight either. "Is God a Moral Monster" by Paul Copan is a good introduction to objections to the Old Testament. If you want something more detailed, but still easy to understand, then "Old Testament Ethics for the People of God" by Christopher Wright seems to be as good as it gets. In any case, best of fortune and I hope you reconsider your beliefs.

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    2. I apologize if you think that I’ve missed what you were saying. Let me address your points.

      First, to directly answer your question, "if God exists, then could he be the foundation of morality?" I would argue no he couldn’t, because like I said, goodness would exist independently of god, so god is not the foundation of morality. If I entertain your hypothetical that god exists, he would merely be tantamount to goodness, but not the foundation of it. I personally don’t grant that a maximally great being is even possible or fully coherent. For example, what standard are you using to determine what maximally great properties are? If you’re using god to measure god, you’re making it circular. Of course god is perfect according to his own standard. Adolph Hitler is also perfect if we measure him up against Adolph Hitler. There would have to be an objective standard that exists even to god in order to avoid a tautology. Otherwise, how can I even determine that god is good?

      Second, maximal greatness is a funny concept. What is maximal greatness according to you and how do you determine it? And why shouldn’t I accept someone else’s criterion for maximal greatness if it differs from yours? What is maximally great for us human beings may not be for another species of intelligent life that had a different biological nature. That’s one reason why I think the concept isn’t fully coherent. And besides, what is maximally great changes from situation to situation. Would god be the ontological moral foundation for killing someone in self defense? I don’t see how these things can be “embodied” so-to-speak, in beings. The maximally great being is just a concept in our heads that we have subjectively invented in our pursuit of what we think are the highest moral virtues. Given that I do not accept the concept of maximal greatness, the rest of what you wrote is predicated on this being a very real thing.

      Third, we can set aside the notion of a particular god and focus instead on a generic concept of god. I think once you try and make a logical connection between the concept of a maximally great being and the god of the Bible, it’s a total non-sequitor. I don’t see how anyone can connect the biblical god even remotely to a maximally great being. Nick, you’re dealing with a guy who has spent the past 5 years debating the existence of god as a full time hobby, so of course I’ve heard of Paul Copan’s book. He’s been absolutely hammered by critics, some of whom are Christian. Did you read Thom Starks book-length critique? It’s online for free here: Is God a Moral
      Compromiser?
      I know the way the apologist operates. They will lie and distort the facts/evidence to try to make their case and they get caught on it over and over again. Copan does this over and over and makes such bad arguments it’s not even funny. All his book does is convince Christians who pretty much already agree with him, or ones not willing to research into Copan’s bad arguments.

      I would like to hear your case that objective moral values cannot exist independently of god – if that’s what you believe. For example, can you name a moral that is good, explain to me why it is good, and then explain to me somehow why that moral would not be good in a hypothetical world where there was no god?

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    3. Okay, before anything I need to address a distinction here that just isn't being made. You're confusing objective moral values with absolute moral values. Absolute moral values would be something like "murder is wrong, without exception" while objective moral values would be "murder is wrong given these circumstances." I am only a defender of objective moral values. It's also worth mentioning that I do not in fact agree with everything Copan says. Also, ANY book defending the Bible is going to gain followers and haters. There are scholars who like Copan's book and scholars that don't. My point was that things are not clear-cut when it comes to the Old Testament.
      Of course, it's also worth mentioning that Copan's critics greatly misrepresent the staunch differences between ancient Israelite culture. As is said in Exodus 21: 1-6, any physical abuse done to a slave warrants the slave's freedom. It says "When a man strikes the eye of his slave, male or female, and destroys it, he shall let the slave go free because of his eye. If he knocks out the tooth of his slave, male or female, he shall let the slave go free because of his tooth." Of course, when you understand the eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth mentality in ancient Israelite culture, you can see that this refers to not to some specific instance where an eye is hurt or a tooth is lost, but a blanket statement for physical harm to a slave. while the Hammurabi code did only have slaves serve 3 years, the way the slaves were treated is 3 years of hell as opposed to 7 years of work.
      Now, as for the general question of whether Paul Copan espouses any sort of moral relativism, I don't think he does. As I said before, if certain laws are more appropriate in a given circumstance then it would be objectively right to give these laws. This does not contradict objective moral values, but only absolute moral values. On that note, it then becomes a question whether these laws given to the Israelites actually were the best laws for them to receive, and that's where things get tricky. A god would certainly know the answer to this question, but we couldn't. We don't know how Israelites would respond to laws like we have in modern culture. While a culture like this is far more civilized, we see that time and time again when a drastic change comes to a culture there is massive resistance, even when it comes to religion. To assume that modern laws would be followed if given to ancient cultures is too farfetched, even if it is supposedly the result of divine revelation.

      Alright, now for your criticism of perfect being theology. What in the world makes you say that goodness would exist outside of God? If we grant a necessarily existing perfect being, if for the sake of arguing, then what we're talking about here is the necessary form of existence itself. Nothing would exist outside of him unless he created something that way. All possible knowledge and power would belong to this being, and nothing necessarily existing can be outside of him. That's the whole notion of a necessarily existing being. I don't think that is at all a problem.

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    4. Now, for your complaints of about objectivity regarding maximal greatness. I didn't make this explicitly clear, but there is a single underlying value in maximal greatness that simply cannot be denied as objective: quality. As I said before, something that lasts longer, is harder to destroy, something that contributes to knowledge, something contributes to ability etc. those are all objectively good things. However, this requires love and desire to be carried out in its fullest. Therefore, we have the cold, objective part of morality, but with the fact that the warm part if (love) is required to bring it out to its fullest. Therefore, since morality is defining what actions are objectively better than others, a maximally great being would know what is objectively better in this sense, would be the foundation of this objectivity by definition, and would contain the love required to bring out the maximal greatness in this quality. I don't see anything that isn't objective here.

      Now, for why naturalism couldn't account for morality. Notice that in my case we have a necessarily existing foundation morality where, if such a thing exists, it being the foundation is essentially a tautology. However, in naturalism the only necessarily existing thing is the universe. There is no objectivity in what is better than another because the concepts of quality regarding morality do not exist by necessity as they do with a maximally great being. I don't of anybody who would argue that we live in a maximally great universe. Therefore, any foundation of morality must be subjective and dependent entirely on the people experiencing what they think is morality, instead of any factual foundation. Without any necessarily existing foundation for what is better regarding quality, we can't have objective moral values. Unless of course, you want to argue that subjectivity can turn into objectivity.

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    5. I’m perfectly well aware of that distinction between absolute and objective moral values. You seem to be saying that god embodies the morally relative situational ethics we all pretty much acknowledge. Some theists espouse absolute morality, some don’t. I would agree with you that morality is situationally contingent.

      Now when it comes to Copan, I guess you can classify me as a hater. I think the guy’s arguments, most of them at least, are bad. He’s admitting essentially that god is a moral compromiser. Think of what this means. It means that the god of the Bible purposely gave moral commandments that were substandard and less than ideal, because the situation apparently called for less than optimal morals. God’s morality in the Bible is a compromise. It’s like a doctor deliberately lying to his patient about their medical condition because they “can't handle the truth.”

      You mention the slavery laws in the Bible as if that’s supposed to make me complacent with slavery itself. Sorry, I'm not a moral compromiser like your god is. Exodus clearly says slave masters can beat their slaves with impunity, so long as the slaves can recover in a few days without permanent injury. But of course that only applies to Hebrew slaves. Non-Hebrew slaves could be treated cruel and kept for life as Lev 25-44-46 clearly says. The fact that Hammurabi’s code in many areas is more humane than the Mosaic Law strikes me odd that anyone can claim Mosaic Law comes from a god who is infinitely wise and compassionate.

      Given our privileged position with hindsight, we can clearly see that many of the Mosaic Laws are barbaric and not anything that any civilized society should want to adopt. You make an argument that there would be resistance if modern laws like ours today were revealed to ancient peoples from god. So what? Isn’t that what god is supposed to do – reveal ideal moral truths regardless of whether anyone likes them or not? Is god just supposed to compromise? I wouldn’t think highly of such a god. But like I said, god is clearly irrelevant to moral values especially a god who deliberately gives us compromised morals because he’s too afraid we’d rebel against better ones if he did.

      On perfect being theology, I made the argument in my post why goodness exists outside of god. You are invoking here the cosmological argument – that god is creator of all things, and therefore created goodness. The traditional moral argument doesn’t address that and I did not address that here in my post. I obviously don’t believe in a creator god, but working under that assumption, if there is one then I don’t see how he can create goodness in the same way I don’t see how god can create numbers or abstract objects. These things will exist on their own at the very least as descriptions of certain states of affairs.

      On maximal greatness, I still don’t see what objective standard you are using to determine what maximal greatness is. You said, “something that contributes to knowledge, something contributes to ability etc. those are all objectively good things.” OK, then they’re objectively good independently of god. But then you say, “since morality is defining what actions are objectively better than others, a maximally great being would know what is objectively better in this sense, would be the foundation of this objectivity by definition.” If this is true it rules out the god of the Bible as this MGB, but in terms of the generic god, these things would still be objectively better or worse independently of god. At best, in terms of the Euthyphro dilemma, you’d take the position that god commands morality because IT is morally good, which is my whole argument.

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    6. Then you say, “Notice that in [theism] we have a necessarily existing foundation morality where, if such a thing exists, it being the foundation is essentially a tautology.” I don’t agree with this, so all of your further points are moot. In order for moral values to be objective, they need not be true in all possible worlds, in every imaginable configuration. They only have to be true in our world given our contingent circumstances. For example, the speed of light is constant and it is objectively true regardless of whether you disagree with it. But there might be another universe where light travels at a different speed. This in no way means that our calculated speed of light is not objectively true for us.

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    7. This conversation is getting nowhere fast. I have things to do so this will be my last response.

      Okay, firstly on Copan and Old Testament law. Once again, I have to point out that the idea of compromising isn't as bad as you think. By compromising he wouldn't be belittling what moral values actually are, but working with free creatures by giving them stipulations that get them on the right track to a morally good society. My argument is that God going all out in his commandments would lead to no free creature at that time following God, which is something a God who actually wants a relationship would not allow.
      As for slavery, there are too many verses to get into a debate that wouldn't take too much time. I'll simply share my stance on matters of wrongs in the Bible. I don't work from the assumption that everything in the Bible must be true. I work from what I consider evidence that God exists and tat he revealed himself through Jesus, and vindicated the claims of Jesus by rising from the dead. This in itself does not require that the entirety of the Bible is accurate and a representation of God actually is. So, even if it were proven that awful slavery was condoned in the Bible, I don't think this damages Christianity. It would only damage those who worship the Bible instead of worshiping God. Of course, this approach does lead to cherry picking, but cherry picking is only a problem if the things you are cherry picking out are not expendable in your worldview. In this case, the good lot of the Bible, while I believe most of it, is not something which I hold as unmovable dogma.

      I'm now going to deal with your bizarre argument that goodness needs to be outside of God. If I understand you properly, you are saying that goodness must be descriptive by nature and therefore must exist independently of God. If maximal greatness is goodness, and God literally is maximal greatness, then there is no good outside of similarity to God. that's of course not to say that atheists can't be good, but simply to say that any good action they perform is an action that God would. Once again, maximal greatness and goodness are biconditional. they aren't separated from one another. They are literally equivalent.

      Okay, you once again just can't seem to understand the core of my argument. Things are objectively of better quality, in terms of the things I mentioned, are literally objective. A brick house objectively better than a paper house, and any knowledge contributing the building a better brick house is objectively good for the quality of the brick house. The ability and tools to build the brick house are also crucial. Now simply apply those principles (and love and desire) to general morality and that's what I mean by maximal greatness providing a foundation for morality. If God exists, then he is by definition maximal greatness. If that is the case, then he is the foundation for morality since morality and maximal greatness are biconditional. I'm not quite sure how to make this any clearer. In any case, the fact that you don't understand my case is very helpful to me. Now I need to go back to the drawing board in how to present my argument. You're quite obviously intelligent, so I reckon the reason you don't understand it is because of jargon on my part.

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    8. I’m sorry if you think this conversation isn’t getting anywhere. I think it is because we disagree on some major concepts.

      When it comes to the Old Testament’s compromised values, can you imagine telling a homosexual who is about to be stoned to death for being gay because Mosaic Law mandates it, that it’s all good and well because if it isn’t done it “would lead to no free creature at that time following God, which is something a God who actually wants a relationship would not allow.” Sorry, Nick but that’s fucking absurd.

      As far as interpreting the Bible, I’m glad you don’t take it all in. Actually living according to the Bible would cause more harm than good. The minimalist approach is the only rational way to interpret the Bible and if I were a Christian I certainly wouldn’t accept about 90 percent of it. When it comes to cherry picking, I'd rather deal with a liberal leaning Christian who cherry picks than a fundamentalist who takes the Bible literally. However, the fact that you must cherry pick shows the Bible is not the source of your moral values and it is not how you determine what it right and wrong.

      When it comes to goodness existing outside of god, let me use an analogy to illustrate the point that might help. Think of how being hot is an essential property of fire – fire must be hot, it cannot be cold. But “hot” can apply to many other things independently of fire. For example, microwaves cause things to be hot and so does friction. If goodness is an essential property of god, it is something that can exist independently of him. Saying goodness and god are the same thing is mere wordplay. It’s taking a beneficial condition like goodness, and then just equating that with the concept of “God.” It doesn’t show anything more than you can make synonyms out of words. I asked in my post, “Is God good because he is loving, compassionate and fair, or is being loving, compassionate and fair good because God is good?” You have yet to directly answer this dilemma.

      You keep going back to this concept of maximal greatness, yet you haven’t fully defined it. What is maximal greatness and what standard are you using to determine it? Until you can do that your arguments beg the question.

      Lastly you try and make something of an argument to show god is the foundation of morality. Let me see if I can deconstruct it.

      1. Things are objectively of better quality, in terms of the things I mentioned, are literally objective.

      I'm not sure about the particular things you mentioned, but I would agree that when contingencies are taken into account, there are objectively better and worse things.

      2. A brick house objectively better than a paper house, and any knowledge contributing the building a better brick house is objectively good for the quality of the brick house.

      If the goal is to have a sturdier house, then yes a brick house is objectively better.

      3. The ability and tools to build the brick house are also crucial. Now simply apply those principles (and love and desire) to general morality and that's what I mean by maximal greatness providing a foundation for morality.

      If we apply those same principles to moral values we would get objectively better and worse moral values, but this says nothing about maximal greatness. This only says there are objectively better and worse moral values contingent upon a species called human beings and certain circumstances they find themselves in.

      4. If God exists, then he is by definition maximal greatness. If that is the case, then he is the foundation for morality since morality and maximal greatness are biconditional.

      Again, here maximal greatness is such a vague concept that you're begging many questions that I asked above. I personally am not convinced the concept of god or maximal greatness is fully coherent, and therein lies the crux of our disagreement.

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    9. I freed up some time to quickly respond to your comment. I think the questions you just asked will really help get to the bottom of the misunderstandings here.

      First of all, I did define maximal greatness. I said that maximal greatness was the maximum amount of objective quality. You keep thinking my description of what maximal greatness is and maximal greatness are two separated things in my argument. Therein lies your mistake. If there is an objective source for maximal greatness then it is tautologically obvious that this source holds morality in the sense given and is the foundation of it.

      Okay, now for your argument about goodness existing outside of God. This actually isn't a problem. Nobody here is denying that goodness can exist outside of God. The question here is whether the standard of goodness itself exists without God. I'm certainly not affirming that God is the only thing that could be good and then nothing else can be, in the same way that heat has multiple ways it can exist. What I'm saying is that God is the prerequisite for any standard of maximal greatness. So, for any such criticism saying that goodness outside of God is actually a problem, you would have to argue that there would be necessarily existing goodness that exists outside of God. Yet, to do that you would have to presuppose that there was no maximally great being, as a maximally great being would be the standard of maximal greatness by definition, and thus under any definition of objective morality would be the foundation for morality as well. Once again, you need to grant the hypothetical that God exists in order to ask the question. If God exists then nothing besides him exists unless he allows it to do so. While a necessarily thing existing outside of God is a contradiction, saying that God is by definition the standard for what we call good and perfectly moral is not. So long as maximal greatness is biconditional with objective morality, there is no dilemma to be had; and so long as you grant that God is necessarily existing, you grant that he is maximal greatness by necessity, and thus is the foundation for morality. It's not that God is good because something else is good or that something is good because God commands it to be; it's that maximal greatness is the only thing that can even be a foundation for objective morality, and since if God exists he is maximally great and literally is maximal greatness, he by definition is the standard for morality. I hope I don't need to go into more detail, I feel like I have been far too repetitive as it is.

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    10. I don’t think your definition of maximal greatness makes it any less vague. The maximum amount of what objective quality exactly are we talking about? You still haven’t mentioned what metric you are using and until you can provide a thorough detailed description including the criterion by which you are determining maximal greatness, your entire argument is founded on your opinion of what maximal greatness is. I see absolutely nothing in what you wrote that comes close to satisfying this.

      When it comes to standards of goodness existing outside of god, I challenged you to give me an argument that shows how love, compassion and fairness wouldn’t be objectively good given a hypothetical world in which there is no god. You ignored that. You’re whole argument rests on this very vague concept of maximal greatness that you have failed to describe in detail.

      You wrote:

      “What I'm saying is that God is the prerequisite for any standard of maximal greatness.”

      Which by the way you have failed to define and describe in a way that isn’t vague and begs many questions. So this statement makes no sense.

      “So, for any such criticism saying that goodness outside of God is actually a problem, you would have to argue that there would be necessarily existing goodness that exists outside of God.”

      That’s exactly what I’ve argued in my post that you’ve failed to refute. I don’t buy the ontological argument that god is a necessary being by the way.

      “Yet, to do that you would have to presuppose that there was no maximally great being, as a maximally great being would be the standard of maximal greatness by definition, and thus under any definition of objective morality would be the foundation for morality as well.”

      Not necessarily. If I grant a maximally great being, it could be tantamount to an independent standard of maximal greatness but not the source of it. And objective morality does not rely on there existing a standard of maximal greatness that is true of every possible world. We only need to know what is relevant for human beings given our circumstances.

      “If God exists then nothing besides him exists unless he allows it to do so.”

      God cannot have created numbers, or abstract objects, or perhaps even logic itself as these things exist necessarily. I happen to think that if god existed he would be co-existent with the universe and not the creator of it and he certainly would not have been the creator of moral values.

      “So long as maximal greatness is biconditional with objective morality, there is no dilemma to be had; and so long as you grant that God is necessarily existing, you grant that he is maximal greatness by necessity, and thus is the foundation for morality”

      But you still haven’t given a satisfying detained description of maximal greatness that doesn’t beg a hundred questions. As far as I know, it’s just a vague concept in your head just as god is. There certainly is a huge dilemma here. If objective moral values exist independently of god, then god is redundant and he is not the standard of those values. He may be the same as them, but he isn’t the standard.

      “It's not that God is good because something else is good or that something is good because God commands it to be; it's that maximal greatness is the only thing that can even be a foundation for objective morality, and since if God exists he is maximally great and literally is maximal greatness, he by definition is the standard for morality.”

      You need to prove to me that maximal greatness is the only foundation for objective morality. I see no reason to accept such a proposition. I gave examples above why this is not so. In addition, things that are good are objectively good independently of god existing or not, hence god is redundant and unnecessary to moral value judgments. Sorry Nick, but I agree that we are going in circles because your entire argument makes no sense and because it is based on an ill-defined concept that exists in your head.

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    11. I honestly don't understand what you're asking. I defined maximal greatness as quality (as in traits such as durability, how long something lasts etc. I have repeated myself enough), and I explained that morality by definition is actions to take that are better or worse than others in an objective sense. Therefore, if we appeal to any standard for morality we must appeal to maximal greatness and exactly what that is. If god exists then he must literally exist as maximal greatness itself. A being that isn't the foundation of all of reality isn't maximally great. Therefore, if God is maximal greatness and we must appeal to maximal greatness for morality then we must appeal to God for morality. I don't know how to make this any less vague. What you're doing is like asking Sam Harris "okay, well what is well being? You certainly have defined it, but what is it really? Well being is just an ill-formed concept in your head." As for many of your other points, such as that you don't buy into the ontological argument, how many times do I have to remind you that you have to grant God's existence for the sake of argument in order to ask a hypothetical question about him? Reductio ad absurdum type arguments don't work unless you first grant the thing that you are reducing to absurdity. I don't care if you don't think the ontological argument works; that's completely irrelevant. Also, I'm well aware that you wouldn't believe that the holy spirit exists. I was simply describing my stance.

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    12. Morality by definition is the distinction between right and wrong actions. What metric are you using to determine it "in an objective sense"? Are you using utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, or divine command theory as your meta-ethical framework in determining objectivity of moral values? Morality is too complex for you to just brush it over in one simple stroke and say "we must appeal to maximal greatness and exactly what that is."

      I don't agree that if god exists he must be maximal greatness. One reason is because I don't think maximal greatness can be defined into a single being because you get contradictions. Maximal greatness is relative to situations and is contingent. The most plausible kind of god to be is a deistic god, and a deistic god need not have maximal attributes in every area.

      Saying, "Therefore, if God is maximal greatness and we must appeal to maximal greatness for morality then we must appeal to God for morality" makes little sense. God would co-exist with maximal greatness and at best god would simply serve as a conduit by which maximal greatness is known and thus god would serve merely as a messenger, but he would not be the foundation of it. I don't know how many times I can spell that out. And here I'm granting your scenario. So you haven't circumvented the Euthyphro dilemma, you've essentially just agreed with the me that if god were to exist, he commands things because they are good.

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    13. *Face palm* are you serious? Did you not hear me tell you at least 4 or 5 times now that things such as durability, capability, contribution to knowledge etc. is what maximal greatness is? THAT IS MY MORAL FRAMEWORK!!! Whatever contributes to things like this are by definition better in terms of moral values. I'm trying SO hard to help you understand this, but at this point it looks like you're trying to not understand it. The only I thing I haven't added is that only creatures actually capable of decision making can be moral agents, but I find that so obvious that it goes without saying.

      "Maximal greatness is relative to situations and is contingent." Yes, given that certain circumstances exist the concept of maximal greatness would be achieved in different ways. So what? The fact that achieving maximal greatness is gone about differently in different circumstances does not at all mean that what maximal greatness is would be different in certain circumstances. Only the method of achieving it would be different. Unless you would like to argue that in some circumstances a thin sheet of a paper is more difficult to cut in half than a 20 ton diamond with just your bare hands.

      Let me ask you this: would a maximally great being be dictated by something other than itself? If you answer yes to this question then I have to question your honesty. If you answer no to this question then you either have to grant that if a maximally great being exists he would be the foundation of reality itself and thus the Euthyphro Dilemma would fall apart, or you would have to resort to an entirely different argument (as you already have done) and try to argue that a maximally great being isn't even possible. Either way the Euthyphro Dilemma is toast.

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    14. I'm serious, you aren't. How exactly am I supposed to translate your maximally great qualities of "durability, capability, contribution to knowledge" into moral values and in what meta-ethical framework am I supposed to do it in? It begs so many questions. Do you even have any education in ethics?

      "[W]ould a maximally great being be dictated by something other than itself?" If I play along and pretend such a being is possible then I would say no, but that being would simply just have the same values that are objectively good to us homo sapiens. It wouldn't in any way be the foundation of them, it would be the same as them. If that being didn't exist, morality would be the same exact as it is now. You have not touched the Euthyphro dilemma one bit, you've just asserted objective values cannot exist independently to god. I don't know how I can get this through to you any more clear. 1) I don't accept that maximal greatness can exist within a being. 2) If I pretend that it could be possible, any such being would be tantamount to objectively good moral values that are contingent upon us homo sapiens, but would not be the source or foundation of them.

      And I find it funny that you have to shy away from defending Christianity in order to better make your arguments as if the god of Christianity holds you back. But once you make the moral argument, you're making the case for theism not deism.

      You might want to read a few posts I wrote about this if you have time: Objective Morality without God

      The Ontological Argument

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    15. This will be the last response that I can give. Christmas is tomorrow and it's going to get really hectic from then on out.

      First of all, I should be asking YOU whether you have any philosophical background on morality. You're asking for a meta-ethical framework, yet, that is ironically the only thing I have specifically given. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta-ethics
      As it is pointed out, there are 3 general questions in meta-ethics. The answer to the first question is that "good/right" and "bad/wrong" are to do with quality in the senses I have given countless times now. The answer to the second question is that these general principles are universal, but they are achieved in different ways given different circumstances (which seems to be the case with any moral theory). The third question is answered simply by saying if an action appeals to these principles and contributes to quality in the sense given, then it is good. If it takes away from it, then it is bad. Of course, I also appeal to the quantity of quality things as a factor as well as the ability to make a decision of your own volition. A person who accidentally trips and ends up setting off a nuclear bomb because of it should not be held morally responsible. The defense of these three answers is only objectively true given that maximal greatness, and a maximally great being, exists. Without maximal greatness we have no objective foundation, and without love then all we get is something cold and calculated, which is far from sufficient to explain moral experiences and morals as being applied to conscious beings (which is really the only thing it can be applied to).
      I didn't want to go into normative or applied ethics too specifically because the primary focus was on what right even meant and what foundation can be given for having an objective stance on this.

      As for your response to my defense of the possibility of a maximally great being... there wasn't one. All you're doing is saying the same thing after I already addressed what you have been saying. You didn't address my defense of the possibility of a maximally great being, and you simply assumed that because humans would have the same value as God that God couldn't be the foundation. Seriously? What do you consider a source to be? I consider it to be what we derive something from as well as the first thing in existence to have this something that we are deriving. God fits that description, and you haven't even objected to that. You haven't at all denied that God, if he was maximally great, would be the first thing in existence to have these properties. Except of course, he literally is said properties, he doesn't "have" them. All I can do now is ask you to rethink your worldview, and ask you to pay closer attention in conversations and learn to address somebody's arguments properly.

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    16. Nick, you're not doing yourself any favors here. You've made no logical or evidential case to make the connection of there needing to be a maximal great being to have moral values that are objectively good. You just keep asserting it, over and over again, ad nauseum. I asked you how god existing affects moral values like love, kindness, and compassion etc. How would these things not be objectively good if I ask you to entertain a hypothetical world in which there is no god? I made the case that god's existence is irrelevant that these things are good. i'm willing to entertain the idea that god exists for the sake of argument, you should be willing to entertain god not existing.

      Now onto the vague idea of a maximally great being, which you still have not defined completely, but rather threw up some qualities like durability, capability, contribution to knowledge. The very use of this metric by which you are trying to determine maximal greatness indicates that an independent standard exists. These qualities are good for a reason, and that reason would be true if god didn't exist. I linked you to two posts that address some of the challenges you made here, so I have responded to them. Then you ask what do I consider a source of morality to be? The source is the positive benefits that certain intentions and actions produce. That has nothing to do with god. Again, to assert that god is those properties is to play word games.

      Here's a thought experiment. Suppose god disappeared but the universe still existed and everything in the universe was the same. Would any positive moral values be any different? Would compassion be any less compassionate? Would kindness be any less kind? You need to tell me what exactly is making these things objectively good and what god's existence has to do with it. I've asked you this several times and have yet to hear an answer. Perhaps if you respond you should just put my questions up and answer them directly so there is no confusion.

      The bottom line is this:your argument fails because you are asserting without justification or reason that moral values depend on god to be objectively good. Your logic fails because you have not demonstrated moral values to be any different, given a godless world. Your first sentence was telling: "an action is good if God would perform the action in a said circumstance." Is that really how you determine whether an action is good? And how the hell do you know what god would do in a certain situation? Especially since you worship a god that is supposed to have committed worldwide genocide, endorsed slavery and the killing of homosexuals. You've literally given the most stupid reason to evaluate moral values.


      This idea that maximal greatness has to exist for objectively moral values is hogwash. These values that benefit us homo-sapiens, may not benefit different intelligent forms of life that are biologically distinct from us. Why such a human-centric outlook on "maximal greatness"?

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  10. Okay, now to briefly address your comments on cherry picking and Moasic law. You're darn right that the Bible isn't the foundation of my morality! The Biblical authors themselves would have a problem with such a stance as they believed that God's law was written on the hearts of man (although one can argue that God wrote it with a pencil and also gave man an eraser). My foundation for moral values is indeed what I have been talking about this entire time: quality, the best amount of quality, and love. This is quite simply the only foundation that seems to make sense. There must be an objective foundation, but as we feel not only intuitively, but intellectually as well that emotions and fellowship play a role, love must also play a part if we are to make sense of objective morality. Also, I let the holy spirit be my guide. I can feel when something is wrong and I can feel when something is right (and not in the neurological sense which is something else that I can easily feel, but I feel something else). Take what you will from that, but I worship God, not a book. Indeed, I have felt many times the holy spirit telling me that there was something terribly wrong with certain passages in the Bible, so I have absolutely no reason to take the Bible as any sort of supreme authority. As for Mosaic law, as I pointed out before that requires a lengthy exegesis to even provide a foundation to examine the topic. Perhaps, when I find the time, I can share why I don't think the Biblical verses on slavery, supposed genocide, and stoning are not problematic as they seem to be prima facie.

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    1. I don't buy into the holy spirit argument of course. Your moral instincts are largely the product of evolution and social conditioning, with a little philosophical reflection thrown in. The holy spirit to me is just an invention in our minds to give a simple explanation to our moral behavior that we did not have an explanation for thousands of years ago. I like that you emphasize the love and compassion foremost however. These are certainly objectively good.

      I'd love to hear your case why biblical verses condoning slavery, genocide and stoning are not problematic.

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