Friday, November 15, 2013
Now perhaps I might not be writing here anything that I haven't already done before on numerous other posts, but since the moral debate is one atheists will find themselves confronted with time and time again, it might be worth repeating. When a theists asserts that god is identical to moral perfection he or she isn't doing anything other than playing word games. I can simply define the word "God" as being a synonym of goodness, but I certainly haven't demonstrated that an actual being exists that is ontologically identical with goodness, let alone been able to conflate that being to the deity of a particular religion. All I've done is played words games with you and claimed victory (ha ha!). But it's a premature calculation.
Seriously though, for any theist who does this, the next trick up their sleeve (if they see you're not convinced) is going to be something like, "It is impossible for God to be evil or command something evil, like rape, because God's intrinsic nature is that of moral perfection. God is necessarily morally perfect." The theist here is trying to get all philosophical on your ass: God is necessarily perfect because he can't be any other way. But I still find it hard to palate the idea of how the theist can know or can determine what a perfect moral being is without appealing to some standard that exists independently of such a being. Otherwise, if the being itself is what determines moral perfection, then is it not the case that one can appeal to the logic that what ever that being does or commands is perfectly moral by definition, no matter what that is? How do we determine that god is morally perfect? If god is simply just being defined as such, then following this line of reasoning allows Islamic fundamentalists to stone to death adulterers and jail/execute blasphemers - hardly something we in the West would consider moral.
So aside from merely defining god into perfection, which fails to establish anything other than an association of words, I require more evidence. A host of positive values can be attributed to god that the theist can say justifies god's goodness. They can even go a step further and say that those positive values are sourced in god. This is where the logical conclusion of the Euthyphro Dilemma comes into play. Things that are good are good for reasons - reasons that don't require appeal to a god*, so the theist must decide whether god is good logically prior to having those attributes or whether god is good because he has those attributes. This is a dilemma perhaps with greater force than the Euthyphro itself, and I don't think one can even create a third option to try to avoid its consequences. I've posed this dilemma to several theists and often all I get in return are circular arguments. For example, to say that those positive attributes are good because god is good and he has those attributes is viciously circular. The claim god is good would be rendered meaningless. This dilemma is why I'm confident the moral argument for god fails.
Corner a theist on this and you can expect to get assertions like this: "I *know* it is true. I'm not interested, in the context of the dilemma, in *showing* someone else it is true." So said a theist on his blog when we were discussing the options of the Euthyphro Dilemma. Since many theists essentially assert their deity is real, I suppose we can expect that they will do the same exact thing when the moral aspects of their deity are under question.
*I suspect that a theist might disagree with the statement that things that are good are good for reasons that don't require appeal to god. They might say that without god, nothing is morally good or bad, just socially advantageous or disadvantageous. William Lane Craig makes this argument all the time. To many divine command theorists, something can only be right or wrong if a competent authority says so. To do this the theist would have to bypass all the positive and negative effects of our moral behavior and their intentions, and simple appeal to what a deity said. In doing so they might have to admit that the commands of such a deity do not correspond to what positively or negatively affects us, a rather disturbing idea. But then they'd be saying that doing X is good because god said so and for no other reason, and we'd be back to the Euthyphro Dilemma all over again.